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Abstract 
A key international marketing decision for many Chinese (and firms from other emerging 
markets) is whether to internationalise their own brands - labelled by the Chinese as OBM (Original 
or Own Brand Manufacturing) - or to be international players by acting as contract manufacturers 
(labelled by  the  Chinese as  OEM (Original  Equipment  Manufacturing)  for  foreign  brand  owners 
(FBOs). The paper discusses some of the extant research on the advantages and disadvantages of each 
business  model  and  then  focuses  on  primary  research  conducted  amongst  8  Chinese  firms  in 
electronics and textiles and the OEM-OBM decisions they face. In so doing, it discusses some of the 
factors  influencing  such  decisions  and  proposes  a  framework  for  reviewing  them  as  firm  and 
environmental circumstances change. 
 
Keywords: OEM, OBM, internationalisation, brand, China. 
 
 
Introduction 
The emergence of Chinese brands into international markets is a topic of importance for 
both the Chinese and their potential Western competitors. For the Chinese, it is a question of 
acquiring competitive strengths, exploiting market opportunities and it is also a question of 
national pride. For Westerners, there is the likelihood of more competition from some strong 
players and, in some situations, the likelihood that erstwhile collaborators will become future 
competitors. As yet, few Chinese brands have established themselves as major players on a 
global basis but firms such as Haier, Galanz and others have become significant forces in 
some product sectors and market segments in some country markets. A key international 
marketing decision for many Chinese (and firms from other emerging markets) is whether to 
internationalise  their  own  brands  or  to  be  international  players  by  acting  as  contract 
manufacturers for foreign brand owners (FBOs). This paper focuses on the development of 
Chinese firms in electronics and textiles and the decisions they face in international markets, 
particularly whether to pursue an OEM or OBM strategy and discusses some of the factors 
influencing such decisions. 
Moving  from  OEM  to  OBM  is  a  critical  decision  facing  a  number  of  Emerging 
countries  at  this  time.  In  2002  the  China  Brand  Strategy  Promotion  Commission  was 
established to help advance top Chinese national brands. The reasons are clear. According to 
Business Week 2003 (Fan, 2006), the world’s top 100 “consumer and retail goods brands 
which rely on overseas production” achieved  sales of US$3,500 billion while the top 100 
OEMs in the Asia Pacific region, which supply those companies, achieved a sales turnover of 
only US$84 billion. Further, on average, the gross margin on OEM products was 19% while 
on OBM goods it was 27% (China Daily, 2008). At individual firm level, it is estimated that 
60% of the price of an iPhone 4 is for Apple’s design and engineering, marketing costs and 
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profit while 31% is for components and only 1% for soldering, assembly and packaging by 
the Chinese OEM. 
While evidence for the precise figures may not be perfect, the general picture is clear 
and movement from OEM towards OBM has  been apparent for some time in some (but 
relatively few) cases. For example, the Hong Kong Trade Development Council reported in 
2003 that many firms planned to develop ODM (Original Design Manufacturer) business., 
This  was  driven  by  the  desire  to  shift  the  basis  of  competition  from  price  to  design,  to 
respond  to  customer needs  and as  a preparatory  step to  building brand names (HKTDC, 
2003).  Gereffi  and  Memedovic  (2003)  report  that  The  Republic  of  Korea  is  the  most 
advanced among East Asian NIEs in developing OBM production and brands. 
 
1.  Literature review  
The  literature  review  examines  the  advantages  of  an  OEM  branding  strategy  in 
facilitating the export of Chinese made products.  It then addresses the wider issues which 
impinge on the OEM-OBM debate and some of the pathways available to firms which wish 
to develop from an initial OEM base. It then examines some of the dangers of not shifting 
strategy and, subsequently, the problems associated with shifting.  
Although it may not be seen as a branding decision by the firms themselves, the choice 
of an OEM business model is a decision not to brand products and which will also largely 
determine its initial foreign market entry mode strategy (Wilson, 2006). In the first instance, 
this is likely to be through passive exporting (Clarke and Wilson, 2009) i.e. FBOs seeking 
OEM suppliers may contract these to manufacture products for them.  
A firm with an unknown brand name, perhaps based in a country with negative country 
of origin cues, will find it difficult to market to foreign countries. OEM branding is one 
strategy which by-passes these hurdles. It reduces the costs of marketing dramatically and 
endorses the product with the customer’s brand name. Very importantly, the product is sold 
through  the  customer’s  already  established  marketing  channels.  There  may  be  further 
advantages for the contract manufacturer if the customer provides assistance with technology 
or perhaps insists on quality controls which improve the manufacturer’s quality standards. 
Large  volume  orders  with  programmed  delivery  schedules  may  also  result  in  the 
manufacturer being able to hone their processes so as to further reduce costs and become 
even more competitive.  
Relationships built will increase the manufacturer’s learning about its customer and 
their markets. This may encourage the OEM to then engage in active exporting. Ultimately 
all this learning, together with the credibility and references resulting from having already 
sold in the market should make it easier for the contract manufacturer to later supply the 
market on an OBM basis should it wish to.  
Hobday  et  al  (1998)  also  discuss  the  contribution  made  by  OEM  business  as  a 
mechanism for Taiwanese and Korean firms to overcome entry barriers into foreign markets 
and force continuous improvements in contract manufacturer quality. Goldstein et al (2006) 
and Yang (2006) also emphasise the benefits of the OEM system in having to conform to the 
QA systems of the GPN (global production network) flagship firms.  
Van Grunsven and Smakman (2005) studied the ‘pathways’ taken during the 1980s and 
1990s by firms in the Singapore garment industry. They identified 7 development trajectories 
amongst  the  57  firms  analysed  and  found  that  OEM  strategies  inevitably  resulted  in 
internationalization as foreign buyers seek sourcing opportunities. However, whilst a few 
OEM  firms  had  added  the  production  and  marketing  of  their  own  brands,  OEM  supply 
remained the basis of their business. Some of the OEM firms had added additional services, 
effectively  moving  towards  an  ODM  situation.  Amongst  the  limitations  in  moving  from 
OEM to OBM, they identified the difficulty for large firms in returning to short runs and the 145 
 
‘credibility gap’ between design, marketing and retail on one hand and manufacturing on the 
other. 
However, Hobday et al (1998) report that many firms wish to break out of their OEM 
role  and  transform  from  latecomers  to  leaders.  Yeung  (2007)  describes  three  corporate 
strategies of leading Asian firms. Firstly, some firms have moved from being subcontractors 
to  become  ‘strategic  partners’  of  the  lead  firms  in  global  production  networks  (GPNs).  
Secondly, some firms have chosen to develop expertise in niche sectors such as specialized 
components. Thirdly, some firms have chosen to make the ‘quantum leap’ to become GBOs 
(global brand owners). 
Child and Rodrigues (2005) classify Chinese internationalization routes as partnerships 
(either through OEM arrangements or J-Vs); acquisition of foreign brands, technology and 
market position; and organic international expansion, as illustrated by Haier. Additional to 
the advantages noted earlier of  the OEM route, they refer to the opportunity to preserve their 
independence,  benefit  from  scale  economies  and  achieve  a  reputation  for  manufacturing 
excellence which may (as in the case of Galanz) confer sufficient bargaining power that they 
can badge their products as ‘made by Galanz’ whilst also branded by the GBO.  
In contrast to the advantages of OEM, Lee and Kim (2004) suggest that, because they 
did  not  shift  from  an  OEM  to  an  OBM  strategy,  Korean  toy  producers  have  all  but 
disappeared. From 700 OEMs a few years ago, only OBM Aurora and two ODMs remain. 
They could not compete with Chinese OEM producers. A second risk is that low margin 
business coupled with a possible reliance on the customer for product improvement means 
the manufacturer will lose the ability to create and maintain a product edge and become 
dependent on low price for winning orders.  
The academic literature seems to give less coverage to the challenges posed by moving 
from OEM to OBM. The costs of switching from OEM to OBM must not be underestimated. 
For example, the possible additional costs – both monetary and time - of building a brand 
overseas, compared to contract manufacturing on an active or passive exporting basis, are 
likely  to  include  R&D,  product  development,  name  search  and  registration,  international 
market  selection,  market  entry  mode  selection  and  implementation,  marketing  channel 
selection and management, marketing communications and marketing planning. On top of 
this, a number of other factors are necessary for success. Wreden (2005) claims that many 
Asian firms switching from OEM to OBM need to develop an understanding of branding and 
to see it as an investment rather than just a cost. He suggests that they tend to equate branding 
with advertising rather than the “ability to develop emotional and experiential …relationships 
with customers”.  
The options facing a firm which wants an OBM strategy are whether to follow a single 
or multi-brand strategy and whether to retain an OEM strategy as well.  TCL, for example, 
has several brands whilst Haier has its one corporate brand. The arguments for each strategy 
have been extensively documented. One key advantage of multiple brands is that it allows 
more market segments to be targeted and therefore potentially greater sales. Retaining an 
OEM strategy also means more opportunity provided that the OEM and OBM options target 
different segments.  
However, the OEM plus OBM option raises the danger of the firm’s business model 
being “stuck in the middle” in a Porterian sense (Porter, 1988) if the same SBU (strategic 
business unit) is engaged in both types of activity. This is because OEM requires an emphasis 
on  low  costs  while  OBM  requires  additional  expenditures  usually  necessary  to  create 
differentiation. The managerial skills and employee attitudes are also necessarily different. 
The Taiwanese laptop computer firm Acer resolved the conflict by deciding to focus on R&D 
and marketing and outsource its manufacturing to other OEM firms (Yang, 2006). A different 
approach was taken by Asus by allocating its OEM business to a wholly owned subsidiary. 146 
 
Nevertheless, other Taiwanese firms such as Arima, Clevo, Elite and Twinhead continue to 
house OBM and OEM business in the same organization (Yang, 2006). 
 
2.  Methodology 
The area within China selected as the sample frame has been referred to (Yang and 
Hsia, 2007) as the Greater Suzhou Area (GSA) and is a relatively new industrial cluster 
within the Yangtse River Delta. It includes the cities of Suzhou and Kunshan, Suzhou itself 
being under one hour from Shanghai by fast train. The area has been a major recipient of 
cross border investment from the Taiwanese IT industry, seeking primarily a lower cost base 
but also opportunities to sell in the mainland Chinese market. Five firms were interviewed in 
the electronics industry, including makers of computer products and other consumer durables, 
of which four were Taiwanese owned. The other three firms were in the textile industry, one 
of which was Singaporean owned. 
The industries selected are characterised by the Chinese OEM – Western OBM model. 
The selection of the specific firms was driven by convenience. They were all identified as 
being of sufficient size and experience to be able to comment on the research issues. The 
number of employees in the GSA sample varied from 200 to around 100,000. An obvious 
limitation of the research is the limited sample size and the consequent omission of very large 
and very small firms.  Responses from large OEMs are likely to differ significantly from 
small OEMs. For example, some OEMs are now so large and so expert in quality mass 
manufacturing and technology development (for example. Foxconn and Quanta) that they are 
probably  in  a  very  powerful  position  relative  to  brand  owners.  Nevertheless,  the  prime 
purpose of the research is to raise and conceptualise the relevant issues, not to quantify them. 
The interviewees were either the Chief Executive, the Chief Financial Officer or Product 
Marketing Managers. They were  chosen on the basis of their knowledge of the research 
issues. A translator was present at all times but six of the interviews were held in English 
directly with the respondent and two relied on the translator. The discussions were held in the 
company premises and lasted between one and three hours.     
The  respondents  were  provided  with  a  limited  briefing  in  advance  but  it  was 
emphasised that the purpose of this was not to direct the conversation but to allow any form 
of preparation which they might consider relevant. Indeed, the respondents were encouraged 
to take the discussion in directions which were most pertinent to them. In this sense, the 
research was largely inductive with the hope that it might lead to some generalisations for 
theory development (Pressey and Mathews, 2003). This approach leaned towards Glaser’s 
perspective that the researcher should start with no pre-suppositions (Easterby-Smith et al, 
2002). 
 
3.  Primary Research Findings 
Firm 1 started selling Chinese brand clothes in the early 1990s making rapid progress 
and building its first factory in early 2000s and expanding capacity greatly in 2005. Recently 
it obtained approval to produce for a number of famous Western brands so that currently, 
some 40% of sales are for export of these via the GBOs. Of the 60% sold in China, 95% are 
Western  brands  but,  again,  they  are  sold  through  to  GBOs  and  through  their  marketing 
operations in China. 5% of sales are Firm 1’s own brand which it would like to sell in foreign 
markets.  Firm  1  has  its  own  design  centre  in  China  which  includes  European  staff  and 
designs for both European and Chinese markets. The problem is a limited knowledge of the 
European market and the marketing channels. Management also believes that the firm is not 
yet big enough but anticipates it will be in the future. 
Firm 1’s management has the energy and resources to further develop its own brand 
portfolio. The motivation to do so is partly that OEM offers limited profit and development 147 
 
opportunities but also for the personal esteem which comes from ownership of a successful 
brand. Firm 1 is also interested in acquiring Western brand names either under license or by 
acquisition of production assets. One idea is to export semi-finished products to be finished 
abroad and then imported back into China in order to exploit the price premium associated 
with a Western country of origin (COO). 
Firm 2 is a major supplier to two GBOs of clothing products for sale in Greater China 
only. Firm 2 is free to sell to other customers abroad and is currently talking to a third GBO 
which identified them because of their industry reputation. However, the existing GBOs do 
not want Firm 2 to manufacture for Chinese brand owners for the Chinese market. One of the 
GBOs is worried about industry legislation in China and so is encouraging Firm 2 to open a 
new factory outside China.  Additional drivers are lower costs and bias against products 
‘made in China’. 
Firm 2 said that their only focus is on manufacturing and that they were happy with the 
margins made. Moreover Firm 2 believed that the GBOs are re-assigning more margin to the 
manufacturers as they seek to enhance their brand image via quality and greater attention to 
supply chain corporate social responsibility issues. Firm 2’s plan to remain as an OEM does 
not preclude it from building a B2B brand within the OEM business and it has been rewarded 
for quality by one of the GBOs allowing it to attach a ‘made by Firm 2’ label to garments 
produced. 
Firm  3’s  parent  company  is  in  Singapore  and  manufacturing  only  is  undertaken  in 
China. Sales from Chinese production are 80% to the USA and 15% to Europe. It does have a 
design  function  in  Singapore  but  most  business  is  still  according  to  the  GBOs  designs. 
Although it sells to around 10 GBOs, it is a strategic partner to one.  
Firm 3 would like to do OBM for the Chinese market. Firstly because of a belief it 
would give them more control over their business, secondly because a lack of knowledge of 
Western markets and tastes and concern about customer reaction there to ‘made in China’. 
However, management thinks OBM would be problematic because of the likely reaction by 
GBOs  and  the  prevalence  of  counterfeiting,  making  it  unprofitable  to  invest  in  brand 
building.  
Firm 4 provides a variety of OEM products and services ranging from assembly only 
to manufacture of complete products with or without design or procurement and has no plans 
to  change.  The  reasons  are  that,  firstly,    they  specialise  in  manufacture  and  have  key 
competences in product knowledge, manufacturing processes and cost down; secondly, as an 
OBM they would have to bear the market risk e.g. unsold inventory; thirdly, OBM would 
bring  them  into  conflict  with  their  current  clients.  However,  in  terms  of  new  growth 
directions, Firm 4 is now considering an own brand consumer electronic product which will 
not compete directly with existing GBO customers for that product. This might be achieved 
by  customisation  for  specific  final  customers  or  marketing  to  different  geographical 
territories. In either instance, Firm 4 would consult with its GBO customers first. 
Firm 4’s business strategy involves choosing a product category in which to compete 
and then select customers, which would normally be GBOs. For example, Firm 4 would not 
select cell phones or lap top computers because there is no margin in OEM. Secondly, the 
customer would be selected on the basis of market standing (share), growth expectations, and 
management  competences,  particularly  financial  skills.  Using  this  approach  means  that 
international  market  selection  is  based  on  targeting  individual  customers  rather  than 
countries. 
Firm 5 is a Taiwanese company which has done OEM business for many years and 
moved  to  China  for  lower  costs.  TV  sets  are  produced  only  for  a  Taiwanese  –  North 
American  JV  and  branded  on  an  ODM  basis.  Computer  screens  (which  they  regard  as 148 
 
complete products) are sold to many GBOs. 100% of production is exported and they seek 
new customers and new countries. They also wish to grow via NPD.  
If Firm 5 had sufficient funds, they would consider OBM but currently have decided to focus 
on OEM. OBM  would take 3-5  years to  achieve brand awareness  and cost  too  much in 
advertising and after sales service. They also doubted whether they would have the design 
expertise to meet consumer tastes. Management felt a further requirement for OBM  would 
be the need to embrace CSR practices. Interestingly Firm 5 prefers to sell to manufacturers 
rather than distributors because of a belief that the latter can help Firm 5 improve its image. 
However, Firm 5 will sell to distributors if those distributors have their own brand.  
Firm  6  manufactures  a  range  of  products  including  vacuum  cleaners,  central 
vacuuming, kettles, bikes, electric bikes (developed for China and now exported to Italy), 
humidifiers, fryers. 99% of vacuums are exported, of which 66% to Europe, 20% to USA and 
the rest to another 65 countries.  
Firm 6 was originally state owned but was privatised and began its new life with 
exports on an OEM basis being initiated by a French importing distributor some 14 years ago. 
Most customers (around 200) today are distributors but more and more supermarkets are 
buying direct including leading retailers in the US, France and the UK. Firm 6 also exports to 
some GBOs. Since 1997, Firm 6 has undertaken R&D and, from 2002, has increasingly 
worked with customers on joint design. Working with confidentiality clauses, this helps both 
parties in that Firm 6 upgrades its technology and foreign partners get exclusive products. 
This type of project business now accounts for over 50% of sales.  
In the Chinese market (which accounts for only 1% of sales) they sell under their own 
brand. Firm 6 would like to do OBM in export markets as well but believes that the costs 
would be too high, particularly establishing a selling network, developing relationships with 
retailers  and  advertising.  Management  also  believes  that  Chinese  brand  names  are  not 
popular. Despite current design capability, R&D is still the biggest hurdle. Firm 6 needs to 
develop new product concepts in order to give people a reason to change from the brands 
they know. 
After an estimated10 years Firm 6 may have enough money, design capability, people 
and after service to be able to build their own brand and Firm 6 will probably focus on export 
OBM unless OBM performance in China has improved by then.  
Firm 7 began with OBM in Taiwan but because Taiwan is small they accepted OEM 
orders.  Later,  under  pressure  from  OEM  customers,  Firm  7  separated  OEM  and  OBM 
businesses  in  terms  of  manufacturing  plants  and  business  decisions.  This  arrangement  is 
advantageous with OEM generating volume and bargaining power with suppliers while OBM 
generates higher profit margins. However, within Firm 7, some believe that OEM customers 
are not completely satisfied and a full split may take place later.   
Firm 7 makes for GBOs, sometimes undertaking R&D and sometimes not. In terms of 
product categories, Firm 7 makes OBM notebooks, cell phones, big screen TVs and computer 
motherboards. Recently, they launched an own branded laptop designed for global markets 
beginning with the USA, followed by China and Japan. 
All OBM products are made in China while plants in North and Central America just 
produce for OEM. Firm 7 has sales companies abroad e.g. in Russia and India which only sell 
OBM products. Sister companies seek OEM business in these countries. 
Firm 8 started as OEM with a gross margin of 3-4% but after 20 years switched to 
OBM and achieve a gross margin of 10%. Now they need to raise volume to increase profits. 
30% of current sales are made in China, 40% in Europe and 10% in South America. Their 
plan is to sell to more and more countries. For Firm 8, OEM is really just assembly. Firm 8’s 
objective is to rival the industry majors and it sees R&D as the mechanism.  149 
 
In summary, the primary research generally confirmed the existing literature in terms 
of the difficulties faced in shifting from OEM to OBM and within this, the specific problems 
of building brands internationally. Additionally, however, it did highlight a broader range of 
issues  affecting  this  decision  which  are  summarised  in  the  next  section  where  research 
conclusions are made in two areas. These are, firstly, the present status of the firms in terms 
of  OEM-OBM  and  intended  future  pathways;  secondly,  the  factors  which  influence  the 
OEM-OBM decision. 
 
4.  Conclusions and discussion 
Whilst there are no absolutely clear dividing lines, the firms in the research could be 
broadly  grouped  as  follows.  One  firm  is  already  OBM  only  having  been  established 
specifically for this purpose. Three are currently largely doing OEM business and plan that 
this will continue to be the predominant focus. The reasons are that they have developed their 
core competences in manufacture and in the provision of associated services. However, even 
one of these firms has recently   introduced a new product under its own brand name. Four 
firms are predominantly doing OEM business but would like to make a positive move into 
OBM  as  well.  OBM  is  seen  as  offering  a  number  of  financial  and,  interestingly, 
psychological benefits for the brand owner. 
The advantages of the OEM model in terms of facilitation of foreign market entry, 
volume sales achieved with limited expenditure and, often, assistance with technology and 
quality enhancement are clear. But so are the risks of OEM and, conversely, the benefits of 
OBM and there does seem to be a natural progression towards OBM. Nevertheless, the OEM-
OBM choice for any particular firm seems to be influenced by a number of factors. These are 
discussed below and summarised in the decision model in Figure 1, adapted from Wilson 
(2005, p.15). 
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Provenance in this context refers to the origins and early experiences and values of the 
firm. Thus, Firm 2 was founded on OEM and sees its success as evidence for its ability to 
build a differentiated and profitable B2B brand within the competitive market for outsourced 
sports clothing. Platform here is largely a combination of vision and mission which help 
define the future domain, direction and ambitions of the firm. Thus the personality and values 
of the founder of Firm  1 have strongly influenced its  growth  ambitions  and the prestige 
perceived  to  emanate  from  consumer  brand  ownership.  Firm  4,  by  contrast  and 
notwithstanding a planned limited foray into OBM, has publicly articulated its mission “to be 
one  of  Asia’s  top  OEM  service  providers”.  Pillars  are  the  underpinning  distinguishing 
capabilities and competences within the firm which lead to its competitive advantage and/or 
superior  customer  value.  Firm  4,  for  example,  focuses  on  advanced  process  engineering 
amongst its pillars which also allow it to provide its customers with feasibility studies of 
proposed  new  designs.  People  in  Wilson’s  original  model  are  replaced  with  overall 
Resources. Cost is a major issue in moving from OEM to OBM and inhibited Firm 5 but Firm 
7 possessed sufficient resources to overcome this constraint. 
According  to  Leinward  and  Mainardi  (2010),  who  refer  to  the  concept  as  the 
“coherence  premium”,  successful  performance  requires  a  firm  to  align  its  “internal 
capabilities with the right external market position”. In the case of the OEM-OBM decision, 
this means matching the above internal firm factors with the key success factors required of 
the two alternative business models. For OBM these would include product innovation, brand 
building skills and market, customer and channel expertise. For OEM, they would include 
lean operations, for example. 
However, the research also suggested that, in addition to this core alignment process, 
several firms were concerned about the influence of a variety of other factors. These have 
been  labelled  “market-place  assumptions”  and  sometimes  result  from  a  firm’s  prior 
experiences. For example, Firm 3 was discouraged from OBM because it feared conflict with 
current customers, because it assumed its lack of understanding of Western culture would 
prevent it from designing suitable products and because it assumed that any successful brand 
it managed to build would suffer from counterfeits.  
Equally, firms have a certain amount of choice about alternative strategic responses 
which may moderate, mitigate or eliminate the impact of these assumptions. As examples, the 
fear of conflict with existing FBO customers assumed to result from moving from OEM to 
OBM can possibly be avoided by using “RCSTP” strategies which refer to marketing to 
different geographical Regions, selecting different product Categories, and using different 
Segmentation, Targeting and Positioning strategies. Firm 4’s foray into OBM, for example, 
will be based on choosing geographical territories and product categories in which its current 
customers do not compete. Firm 1 has engaged European staff to bring Western cultural 
understanding into is design capability while Firm 6 has engaged in joint NPD research in its 
attempt to bridge this assumed gap. As a final example, Firm 1 has considered the licensing 
or acquisition of foreign brand names as a strategy for coping with the assumed negative 
attitudes towards Chinese brands. 
Having considered the above influences, perhaps the ultimate criteria for choosing 
between OEM and OBM will be the short and longer term impacts on growth, cash flow-
profit and control-risk. Different firms see the two options in a different light. Thus Firms 1 
and 5 see growth coming from building consumer brands while Firms 2 and 7 see much 
opportunity within the OEM market. Likewise, for some firms, OBM offers more control 
over their destiny through a reduction in the risk of price-based customer defection while 
others see more control arising from the careful management of OEM business without the 
risk  of  brand  building  failure,  greater  stockholding  and  debtor  expenses.  In  terms  of 151 
 
shareholder returns, some firms see OBM as offering higher profits through better margins 
while others see OEM as providing improved cash flow with the opportunity for improved or, 
at least, adequate margins. 
 
While in the short and medium term, the reality is that a capabilities-driven strategy 
provides  coherence,  in  the  longer  term,  firm  internal  factors  such  as  resources  and 
competences change, as does the external competitive and collaborative and environmental 
context, such that the OEM-OBM decision or the OEMplusOBM decision will need to be 
continuously monitored and perhaps revised. 
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